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Ethical Problems of Government Lawyers
JAMES W. PAYNE, JR.

Most discussions of the ethical problems confronting
an attorney for the government refer primarily to the
more obvious situations involving a potential conflict of
interest, such as the offer of some substantial benefit
from a private party having business with the government and seeking the aid or good will of the attorney. To
be sure, these problems exist and should not be minimized. There are, however, problems with subtler overtones (although they may involve substantially the same
interests) which present ethical difficulties and which
cannot be resolved neatly by reference to existing canons
of ethics. Although it is not suggested that the government lawyer is in the position of a monopolizer as to the
difficulties, real or imagined, discussed herein, he may
be peculiarly vulnerable to some of them. He owes an
obvious duty to serve the public interest; he often performs or fails to perform in public fashion; the nature
of his responsibilities makes his performance a matter
of public and political concern, and, certainly, concern
on the part of economic interests affected thereby.
Assuming, for the sake of illustration, that lawyer, L,
is employed by an agency charged with enforcing the
anti-trust laws, the following are suggested as recurrent
problems and discussed under two broad headings:
1. The problem of the ''small deep freezer."'
As best the author can determine, no government attorney is wrapped in cotton wool by his agency. Inevitably, then, L will have frequent contact over a substantial period of time with those lawyers whose clients
have frequent business with the agency involved. A
genuine or psuedo-friendly relationship may develop.
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Should L accept the small and customary gift e.g., passes
to World's Fair exhibits, Christmas turkeys, tobacco,
luncheons, honoraria or generous expenses when called
upon to travel and make a talk, and similar relatively
small items presented to him on infrequent occasions
and not necessarily or even usually according to any
schedule ? It is conceivable that the question can be answered by the word game involved in referring to such
items as token gifts, or, via variety, small courtesies. It
is also possible that rejecting such items can make L
feel a trifle silly or, perhaps, more than a little pompous
or prudish. Occasionally, rejection simply is not feasible
because of the nature of the item or favor extended. The
difficulty can be compounded if L, from time to time,
devotes his energies to advice or informal consultation
with the donor regarding the latter's problems, involving time or effort substantially beyond the requirements
imposed by L's office but within the limits of his discretion. Such a situation is conducive both to the friendly
relationship described and an accompanying and increasing tender of favors to L.
2. The pressures of expediency.
In Pickwick Papers, Charles Dickens has two of his
characters engage in a brief dialogue:
'It's always best on these occasions to do what the
mob do.' 'But suppose there are two mobs?' suggested Mr. Snodgrass. 'Shout with the largest,' replied Mr. Pickwick. (Dickens, Charles, Pickwick
Pa/pers, New York: Modern Library, n.d., Ch. 13)
The government lawyer, barring extreme circumstances, is relatively secure in his employment. However,
he is not assured of promotion, interesting or significant
work, the trappings of status, or relative permanence of
location. One or more of these prospects would be important to L and to his family. One is reminded of the
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conjecture as to Mrs. Henry's reaction to Patrick's
speech at the suggestion that L should remain on a white
charger. Many government attorneys are in a position
to make decisions or to participate in the formulation of
policy that will affect the public interest. This statement
sounds so very trite, but the trite truth expressed affects
millions of lives in various and important ways. It is
here that we may witness the goring of many an ox,
and, conceivably, if the owner of the ox is sufficiently
influential and vocal in his wrath, the goring of many
a lawyer. Most men who hold jobs above the shoeshine
level are vulnerable to personal or economic pressure.
As to them we may often simply suggest that each man
must decide whether he will live according to his own
and best lights, feeble though they may be. This could
be supplemented by a reference to Professor Fuller's
discussion of the morality of duty and the morality of
aspiration, and, in truth, the sense of obligation to the
public and to oneself must, in such large part, be selfsustained. Fuller, Lon L., The Morality of Law. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, Ch. 1.
But political pressure, sometimes subtle, sometimes an
unanswerable roar of red rage, can be a peculiarily
powerful form of attrition, retaliation, or rapid devastation. Susceptibility to such pressure, to the extent that it
influences the conduct and decisions (or total abstention
from conduct and decisions of any significance) on the
part of the government lawyer or his agency, can affect
the entire national population. The author poses the
question which will be reserved for subsequent comment:
Is there any proper and practical method of protecting
the lawyer or his agency from political or economic reprisal for unpopular actions or decisions which are
neither arbitrary nor irrational? This is indeed a delicate question and serious ethical and legal problems
would confront any such effort.
. It is perhaps likely that the temptation to be ex-

154

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES

pedient rather than right will arise from pressures imposed within the agency itself. L's superior, Who is himself under pressure, may demand anything from money
to services for political ends and in response to a party
policy that he serves. Discipline for refusal could come
from within the structure of the agency, again in the
form of altered employment, linited prospects for promotion, or reduced responsibility. L may feel that he
should be free from a demand to contribute some fixed
sum of money to a given political party. Yet the demand
may come, and it may require some boldness to refuse,
and this can be true even though discipline is an
imagined and not a real threat.
Similar influences affect areas in which the lawyer's
function is to make recommendations or to participate
in decisions regarding cases potentially or actually before his agency. Perhaps most of us would accede to the
proposition that if L performs the semi-judicial function
of making either preliminary or final decisions affecting
or potentially affecting any party to the case or the
public interest, he should be free irom any prospect of
discipline resulting from the unpopularity of his decision, excepting the extreme situation involving dishonesty or gross incompetence on his part. Yet the path
to this goal must, assuredly, be a rocky one. Among the
more obvious boulders, the following may be suggested:
If L is not a career lawyer, is it natural to suspect that
he may cast an eye toward prospective employers while
formulating his decision? If L is a career lawyer, is it
unreasonable to suppose that he may be tempted to
render a decision or make a recommendation that is
counter to his judgment, but that is safe in that it accords with agency policy or Congressional sentiment, or
safe in the sense that a ruling adverse to the "defendant" places the entire burden of reversal upon the latter
instead of the agency so that authoritative disposition
of the case is less apparently an agency action? Is it
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also possible that the sheer size and economic or political

strength of a corporation or an industry with which the
agency is concerned can create most of the foregoing
problems in addition to the policy problems entailed in
the very decision to strike at large aggregations of economic power? This, of course, can frequently be a matter of agency policy. It is possible that the factors determinative of such a policy can involve ethical considerations. Our anti-trust laws, for example, reflect a basic
political philosophy as well as an economic philosophy.
It would seem entirely justified, without the necessity
of extensive reference, to suggest that administrative

agencies "make law" within the sphere of their activities (conceding differences in methods of operation)
pretty much as courts or judges make law. It is also
possible that this process, dealing as it does with a
purposive set of human inclinations, has achieved, or
will achieve, the "morality" of a creative process striving through reason to discover principles of order that
will yield a maximum fulfillment of the large complex of
individual and social purposes within the ambit of the
agency's concern. This is an end or a purpose in the
same sense that economics may be said to have the less
ambitious purpose of solving problems relating to the
distribution of resources. This same idea is suggested by
Justice Cardozo when he states that the phrase natural
law "ought to mean today the law that springs from the
relations of fact which exist between things." Cardozo,
Benjamin N., Nature of the Judicial Process. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1921, p. 123.
This means nothing more pretentious than the fact
that the essence of the judge's function is the application
of reason to discover and apply those principles that will
be conducive to successful group living in the environment that confronts him. Sometimes this will require the
creation of precedent; sometimes adherence to precedent; and, sometimes, it will result in some form of in-
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novation. In any event, in time, this process can result
in a core of tradition, philosophy, and decisional law that
might survive political change and pressure. The chances
that this will be true, and that attorneys working within
the agency will be accorded a fair measure of freedom
from undue pressures or temptation of a degree that is
undesirable might be enhanced if the heads of agencies
possessed the life tenure of judges, with the disciplinary
power over agency attorneys vested in their hands under
procedural steps provided for by legislation.
This proposal is not suggested as a panacea, but it is
responsive to a query raised earlier in this note; and it
might be worth considering as a step that would tend to
reduce the number and severity of the ethical difficulties
that we have attributed to the lot of the government lawyer. Certainly, with our long tradition of respect for the
judicial process, most of us might react with considerable indignation at the suggestion that our judges be
made quite so vulnerable to economic or political pressure. Yet the government lawyer often judges, and often,
too, shapes national policy in ways that are not the responsibility of the traditional judge or within his power.
Obviously, substantive and procedural safeguards should
exist to safeguard the public from the incompetent, from
the consistently lazy, and from the dishonest lawyer, if
any such tenure proposal be implemented.
More specifically, and with reference to the categories
of problems suggested herein, this tentative proposal
might be effective in the following ways:
1. Consider our first problem involving the "little
deep freezer": It certainly seems desirable to preserve
an area within which relatively informal conferences and
negotiations may take place between the citizen or industrial enterprise and the government. The administrative agency possesses a degree of flexibility here that a
court, as presently structured, could not possibly match,
as witness the large number of labor-management settle-

ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

157

ments in NLRB regional offices, the advisory opinion
program of the Federal Trade Commission, or the Whole
area of field examination by administrative agencies. At
the same time, if the commissioners themselves are cast
more in the traditional role of judges than the role of

relatively temporary political appointees or politicians,
with their own ambitions pressing upon them, two things
might happen: (a) The agency might have sufficient continuity to establish a known tradition (or something
more positive) concerning the various kinds of problems
involved in the tender of small favors which might well
serve to prevent the government lawyer from feeling
either compromised or embarrassed. (b) The degree of
movement away from the political arena and toward the
concept of an agency exercising a judicial function in a
relatively customary and traditional manner might well
place the agency's attorney more on the level of a law
clerk with reference to the problems previously noted,
with the dual effect of internal sanction and relative
freedom from embarrassment in rejecting our "little
deep freezer."
2. Second, as to the pressures toward expediency:
The fact that L would achieve relative independence
from economic or political pressure would seem obvious
if L is primarily answerable to commissioners who are
free from such pressure. The need to bend to the quick
cry of outrage is simply reduced to the point of de minimus, except as pressure can be applied via Congressional
control of agency funds, agency organization, or by the
spotlight of publicity resulting from Congressional criticism. It is possible, however, that Congressional response to constituency pressure can and would be more
restrained if the pressure is directed toward an independent and more clearly judicial body over which Congressional control is substantially reduced.
The shift from relative sensitivity to political pressure
to the security and long term responsibility of a func-
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tion more closely resembling that of the traditional judiciary could, conceivably, have additional consequences.
Just as we tend to be more careful, in an average of
instances, in the selection of our judges, the same tendency might become stronger and more manifest in the
selection of our administrative officials. Also, both because of increased selectivity and the change of emphasis
regarding the position of the administrative official, it
is at least possible that the process of adjudication on
the administrative level might tend to be more objective
and more responsible. There is authority for this, although stated in terms of extremes. In his book Productive Thinking, Professor Wertheimer states:
One can sometimes observe marvelous changes in
individuals, as when some passionately biased person becomes a member of a jury, or arbitrator, or
judge, and when his actions then show the fine transition from bias to an honest effort to deal with the
problems at issue in a just and objective fashion.
The very development of the idea and institution of
courts of justice is at issue here. (Wertheimer, Max
W., Productive Thinking, New York: Harper and
Bros., 1945)
The implications of this shift to some sort of "permanent tenure" for the heads of administrative bodies
are also various for the attorneys employed by these
bodies. Given a sustained effort toward objectivity and
impartiality at the top level and a more apparent continuity of tradition and precedent, it is certainly conceivable that this would be reflected in the efforts of
agency lawyers insofar as the quality of their preliminary, or perhaps, final, decisions are concerned. Certainly, this would seem to be true with reference to the vast
bulk of intermediate decisions subject to agency review
at the highest level. Further, if the atmosphere within
the agency is that it is "out of politics," with a job to
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do, the lawyer for the agency may well seek to perform
that job with less regard for political expediency or
popularity. It may also be true that counsel for private
enterprise, as an employee of such enterprise, might
find shelter in the position of the agency which would
tend to make him less responsive to the desires of prospective employers, where responsiveness would amount
to a "yes-man" kind of expediency. Concern for the
public interest could achieve a more prominent role in the
work of such a lawyer, given a substantial degree of independence from extraneous pressure and a heightened
respect for the decisional process within the agency.
Admittedly, this brief note is incomplete, offers no
detailed proposal, can be classified as a tentative and
general suggestion for thought, and certainly tenders
no panacea for the problems noted here or for those not
noted. Some readers may fear with Hayek in his Road
to Serfdom (1950) that a proliferation of governmental
agencies is inconsistent with a democratic society, vesting arbitrary power to hurt or help a citizenry in the
hands of governmental agents, with an accompanying
dependancy upon the largesse of bureaucrats and decline in the independent exercise of political rights. The
tenure suggestion tossed out for consideration is not
necessarily calculated to increase social or economic control by the administrative process. The author wonders
if the proposal for relative independence on the part of
the agency and removal from the political arena might
not remove some of the bias and potentially arbitrary
character of a control that already exists.

